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"NORMALIZATION" OF JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH BEIJING

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1. The prospect that Japan will soon resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union is accelerating a strong trend in Japan toward the "normalization" of relations with Communist China. Restored Tokyo-Moscow ties may also be followed by renewed Japanese diplomatic contacts with the Eastern European satellites.

2. Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu has informed our ambassador that the most dangerous consequence arising from the recent Moscow negotiations of a fishery agreement is the impetus given to Japanese forces favoring the "normalization" of relations with Beijing. However, the foreign minister believes that his government would do little to reverse this trend. He considers it only a question of time until Japan will be forced to normalize relations with Beijing.

3. Both Soviet pressure on Japanese fishing in waters north of Japan and the recent Moscow negotiations of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ichiro Kono have put Tokyo well on the way to restoration of full diplomatic relations with the USSR. Even before Kono arrived in the USSR, he persuaded the Japanese government to grant Moscow permission to replace the chief of its long-unrecognized "mission" in Tokyo and to add "fisheries" experts" to the mission's staff. The shift in the Japanese attitude towards the Soviet mission in Tokyo has since been further emphasized by the admission of the Secretary-General of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party that the mission now enjoys de facto recognition.

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a. The two formal agreements Kono concluded at Moscow--a fishery agreement and a sea rescue pact--are dependent on the timely resumption of diplomatic relations, and negotiations on this subject are to be resumed by 31 July. Consequently, the major problem for the Japanese is the manner for reopening relations. The alternatives are whether to follow the "Adenauer Formula" (a prompt exchange of ambassadors without a formal treaty) or to try instead for a treaty which would call for future consideration of Jap claims to the Southern Kurils and Sakhalin.

b. Moscow has long urged Tokyo to accept the establishment of formal diplomatic relations first, with outstanding issues to be settled subsequently. The desire of Japanese leaders to keep Japan's territorial claims alive is promoting support for an "Adenauer" type of settlement. Bulganin's cryptic assurance to Kono of both Soviet support for Japan's admission to the UN and the return of some Japanese prisoners will further incline Japan toward an "Adenauer" settlement.

c. The new chief Soviet representative in Tokyo has already indicated that the Japanese must officially recognize his mission before any details arising out of this season's provisional fishery agreement can be ironed out. Japan's need to make arrangements safeguarding its fishing fleet during the present season may well compel the government to undertake such official contacts even before 31 July, thereby making any foot-dragging in formal negotiations with the USSR increasingly pointless.

4. A majority of Japanese, on the political right as well as the left, have long held that Japan must ultimately establish relations with Communist China. Tokyo's primary concern has been

only the timing of moves in that direction so as not to irritate the US. Many Japanese officials have indicated they feel US policy toward Communist China ignores the "facts of life" and apparently hope Washington's attitude will change in the near future.

a. Japanese moves have been primarily directed toward increasing trade ties with China. They plan to exhibit embargoed goods at Chinese trade fairs, to press for a reduction of CHINCOM controls and to make increased use of "exceptions." Tokyo also has concluded a quasi-official postal agreement with Peiping and is ready to exchange unofficial trade representatives.

b. The tempo of the trend for Japanese relations with Peiping appears to be rising. Foreign Minister Shigenitsu last week noted that the recent Egyptian recognition of Communist China, the president of Pakistan's suggestion that the US recognize Peiping, and the prospective establishment of a French trade mission were all strong influences for similar Japanese action. In voicing this view to our ambassador, he apparently was expressing official anxiety that further delay might isolate Japan from its most important neighbor.

3. Internally, it is the Hatoyama group in the government which strongly desires to realize its campaign promise to normalize relations with the Soviet Bloc. This group evidently feels that popular acceptance of Kono's Moscow agreements will enable it to exploit his negotiations as a diplomatic triumph enhancing the group's prestige. The Hatoyama group also believes that an early cabinet shuffle can be successfully carried out to consolidate its control of both the government and the Liberal-Democratic party.

a. Current speculation on the impending shuffle sees the dropping of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. Shinsuke Kishi, a contender for the premiership, would become deputy prime minister, while Kono will take over as Liberal-Democratic party secretary general, to assure party control.

b. Former Yoshida Liberals are the principal opponents of Matsuzawa's foreign policy and the proposed cabinet change. Their prospects for stopping the present trend toward "normalization" of Sino relations, however, appear dim.

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